Wire fraud usually does not start with an obvious system breach. It often starts with a normal-looking email account, a hidden mailbox rule, or one person signing in from the wrong place.
For real estate agents, brokerages, and property managers, that matters because money often moves after a chain of ordinary messages. A closing update, a vendor invoice, a deposit request, or a payment change can look routine until the wrong person is controlling the thread.
The attack usually starts before the wire
By the time fake wire instructions show up, the problem may already be days old. Someone may have gained access to an inbox, watched the conversation, and waited for the right moment to step in.
That is why business email compromise is hard to spot. The message may come from a real account. The name may be familiar. The timing may make sense. The only thing wrong is the destination for the money, the attachment, or the next step being requested.
In real estate work, that can mean:
- changed wire instructions near closing
- vendor payment changes sent by email
- lease deposit instructions that do not match the usual process
- invoice replies that come from a real mailbox but point somewhere new
The warning signs are small
Most teams look for obvious spam. Wire fraud does not always look like spam. It can look like a short reply from someone already in the conversation.
The clues are usually smaller:
- a payment change that arrives late in the process
- pressure to move quickly
- a new account number or payment method
- a sender asking to avoid a phone call
- an email rule that hides replies or forwards messages
- a login from a city, device, or country that does not fit
None of those prove fraud by themselves. They are signs to slow down and verify through a channel you already trust.
What to lock down first
The first layer is not complicated. Every business account that handles transactions, deposits, owner funds, vendor payments, leases, or client documents should have multi-factor authentication turned on.
MFA does not solve everything, but it raises the cost of getting into the account. It also gives you a better chance of catching a bad login before someone sits inside the mailbox for a week.
The next step is checking mailbox rules and forwarding. A compromised account often has a rule that hides replies, moves certain messages, or forwards mail somewhere else. If an inbox has rules nobody remembers creating, that deserves a closer look.
What to check during a transaction
When money is involved, do not rely on the email thread alone. Verify payment changes by phone using a number you already had before the change came in. Do not use the phone number inside the message asking for the change.
That one habit prevents a lot of damage. It also keeps the process simple enough for a busy office to follow.
A practical check looks like this:
- keep known phone numbers for title, escrow, owners, vendors, and managers
- verify payment changes outside the email thread
- check MFA before high-value work begins
- review mailbox rules after suspicious messages
- remove old accounts when people leave
- avoid shared passwords for transaction tools
This is not about making the work slower. It is about making the risky moments harder to abuse.
Property managers and brokerages have the same problem
This is not only a closing-table issue. Property managers send owner payments, vendor payments, lease documents, and renewal notices. Brokerages handle transaction updates, commission questions, document requests, and payment instructions that can be abused if an account is compromised.
The dollar amount may be smaller than a home closing, but the pattern is the same. A trusted email account asks someone to change how money moves.
That is why the fix should cover the whole workflow, not just one person’s mailbox.
When to ask for help
If an account has suspicious logins, strange mailbox rules, missing replies, or a payment message that does not feel right, pause before sending money.
The useful next step is a direct account review: check sign-ins, confirm MFA, look for forwarding rules, clean up old access, and make sure the people who handle transactions know how payment changes should be verified.
Most of this can be handled before there is an emergency. That is the better time to do it.